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Breaches Within Breaches:  
The Crossroads of ERISA Fiduciary  
Responsibilities and Data Security 
GREGG MORAN* 
Although the drafters of the Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) likely could not have 
anticipated the data security issues of the twenty-first cen-
tury, ERISA’s duty of prudence almost certainly requires 
employee benefit plan fiduciaries to protect sensitive partic-
ipant data in at least some manner. This Article suggests the 
Department of Labor should issue a regulation clarifying fi-
duciaries’ data security obligations. Given that fiduciaries 
are in the best positions to recognize their plans’ individual 
security needs and capabilities, the regulation should not at-
tempt to micromanage fiduciaries’ substantive data security 
policies; rather, it should focus on the procedures by which 
they adopt their substantive policies. In addition to promot-
ing specially tailored policies for protecting sensitive partic-
ipant data, this regulation would resolve much of the confu-
sion surrounding the application of ERISA to the data secu-
rity field. 
 
                                                                                                         
 *  Gregg Moran, attorney in Tampa, Florida. Thank you to my family and 
friends for their support, particularly my wife, Julianna.  Thank you also to the 
members of the University of Miami Law Review for their work editing this piece. 
Special thanks to Professor Colleen E. Medill. As always, all typos, errors, and 
bad opinions are my own. The American College of Employee Benefits Counsel 
selected this Article as the winner of its 2018 Sidney M. Perlstadt Award. 
484 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:483 
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................... 484 
I. OUR MODERN DATA SECURITY CRISIS ................................. 488 
A. The Threats to Sensitive Data ........................................ 488 
B. Legal Responses to the Threats...................................... 491 
II. ERISA’S FIDUCIARY STRUCTURE......................................... 496 
A. The Duty of Prudence .................................................... 497 
B. The DOL’s Enforcement Role ........................................ 500 
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF ERISA TO DATA SECURITY POLICY ..... 503 
A. ERISA Preemption of State Laws ................................... 503 
B. The Federal Regulatory Desert ..................................... 506 
IV. A PROPOSED APPROACH TO THE DUTY OF PRUDENCE AND DATA 
SECURITY ............................................................................ 509 
A. Policy Goals of Data Security Regulation ...................... 509 
B. Reactive vs. Proactive Regulatory Approaches .............. 514 
C. The Substance of the Duty to Protect Data .................... 515 
D. Policy Benefits of the Proposed Regulation ................... 520 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................. 522 
APPENDIX: PROPOSED LANGUAGE OF THE NEW REGULATION ..... 524 
INTRODUCTION 
Eighty million people. When hackers gained access to Anthem 
Insurance’s servers, approximately eighty million people could only 
sit in disbelief, realizing that thieves around the world had access to 
their private information, including their Social Security numbers.1 
In a sense, a breach of this size can become statistical noise, with 
commentators focusing on the large-scale implications while ignor-
ing the individual victims.2 On a different level, however, it is im-
possible to forget that each of the eighty million line items in the 
compromised data represents an individual person—an individual 
person for whom the ever-present menace of identity theft now 
looms in the background. That reality, in a nutshell, represents the 
modern data security crisis. Although new technology has granted 
                                                                                                         
 1  Shari Rudavsky, Anthem Data Breach Could Be ‘Lifelong Battle’ for Cus-
tomers, INDYSTAR (Feb. 5, 2015, 7:56 PM), https://www.indystar.com/story/news 
/2015/02/05/anthem-data-breach-lifelong-battle-customers/22953623/. 
 2  Cf. Ronald Bailey, “The Death of One Man Is a Tragedy, the Death of 
Millions Is a Statistic.”, REASON: HIT & RUN BLOG (Jan. 7, 2009, 1:32 PM), 
https://reason.com/blog/2009/01/07/the-death-of-one-man-is-a-trag (suggesting 
that disasters can start to lose some of their personal impact as they grow in size). 
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opportunities for society to grow, connecting individuals and data in 
ways never previously imaginable, it has also opened the door to 
bad actors who abuse these systems for their own selfish gains. A 
sophisticated criminal with internet access can now effectively pick 
the pockets of millions of people worldwide, all from the relative 
security of a foreign country with lax policing standards.3 
Confronted with this intimidating and rapidly changing techno-
logical landscape, plan fiduciaries under the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”)4 often find themselves try-
ing to navigate a minefield without a map. To carry out their basic 
functions, these fiduciaries must maintain large quantities of highly 
sensitive participant data.5 But doing so makes them prime targets 
for hackers and thieves.6 Adding to the complexity, these fiduciaries 
must often give outside service providers (e.g., investment brokers 
and health insurers) participant data so they can administer ERISA 
                                                                                                         
 3  See Morgan Chalfant, Feds Find Some Foreign Hackers Are out of Reach, 
HILL (Nov. 29, 2017), https://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/362458-feds-find-
some-foreign-hackers-are-out-of-reach (describing some of the difficulties Amer-
ican law enforcement faces when trying to hold foreign cybercriminals accounta-
ble). See generally Cyber’s Most Wanted, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, 
https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/cyber (last visited Feb. 21, 2018) (listing the FBI’s 
most-wanted cyber criminals, many of whom hail from foreign countries includ-
ing Russia, Iran, and China). 
 4  Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 
93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified in scattered sections of 26 and 29 U.S.C.). For pur-
poses of clarity, this Article provides citations to both the ERISA provisions and 
their corresponding U.S. Code sections. Short-form citations are to the ERISA 
sections rather than the U.S. Code sections. 
 5  See Michelle Capezza & August E. Huelle, Considering Best Data Prac-
tices for ERISA Fiduciaries, LAW360 (May 5, 2015, 1:32 PM), https://www.ebg 
law.com/content/uploads/2015/05/Capezza-Huelle-Considering-Best-Data-Prac-
tices-For-ERISA-Fiduciaries.pdf (describing challenges and concerns ERISA fi-
duciaries must manage).  
 6  See id.  
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plans.7 Overlaying this scene is ERISA’s duty of prudence, which 
requires fiduciaries to act “with the care, skill, prudence, and dili-
gence” of a “prudent man” when satisfying their obligations to the 
plan—a standard that almost certainly requires fiduciaries to safe-
guard sensitive participant data.8 
To date, the Department of Labor (“DOL”) has been relatively 
silent with respect to fiduciaries’ responsibilities to protect plan 
data. Aside from the occasional report by the ERISA Advisory 
Council,9 fiduciaries lack specific administrative guidance from the 
DOL regarding issues such as protecting their computers against 
                                                                                                         
 7  See generally EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T LABOR, MEETING 
YOUR FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITIES 1–4 (2017) https://www.dol.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-activities/resource-center/publications/meeting-
your-fiduciary-responsibilities.pdf (providing a basic overview of fiduciary re-
sponsibilities when exchanging data with service providers); Norman P. Stein, I, 
Fiduciary: Some Reflections on the Definition of Fiduciary Under ERISA, 6 
DREXEL L. REV. 555, 564–55 (2014) (describing broadly how ERISA fiduciaries 
might transfer some of their administrative or managerial functions to outside ser-
vice providers). 
 8  See ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (2012); infra Sec-
tion II.A (applying the duty of prudence in the context of data security). 
This Article focuses solely on the theft of data from employee benefit plans; 
it does not address situations in which thieves use stolen data to steal actual plan 
assets. Simply put, the theft of plan assets poses a different set of issues, given 
that we can quantify stolen dollars from a pension plan whereas placing a “value” 
on stolen data is effectively a guessing game. See infra Section I.B (addressing 
the issues of quantifying the harm to consumers resulting from data breaches). To 
that end, fidelity bonds under ERISA section 412 can address some of the risks 
posed by insider thefts of plan assets, while commercial crime insurance can ad-
dress some of the risks posed by outsiders; those options are not as readily avail-
able in the data theft context. That said, some of this Article’s suggestions—par-
ticularly its proposed regulatory emphasis on the procedures by which fiduciaries 
adopt data security plans rather than the substance of plans they adopt—could 
have application in the plan asset context. Cf. infra Appendix (outlining a possible 
regulation the Department of Labor might promulgate to guide plan fiduciaries 
with respect to their data protection obligations). 
 9  See, e.g., ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EMP. WELFARE & PENSION BENEFIT 
PLANS, CYBERSECURITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR BENEFIT PLANS 1 (2016), https:// 
www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/about-ebsa/about-us/erisa-advisory-coun-
cil/2016-cybersecurity-considerations-for-benefit-plans.pdf [hereinafter 2016 RE-
PORT]; see also ERISA Advisory Council Reports, U.S. DEP’T LABOR, 
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/about-ebsa/about-us/erisa-advisory-coun-
cil/reports (last visited Dec. 15, 2018) (listing reports by the ERISA Advisory 
Council).  
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outside attackers and analyzing the data security practices of third-
party service providers. Arguably, and somewhat paradoxically, the 
DOL’s past restraint with respect to data security regulation has 
been the best approach—by not rushing headfirst into the quagmire 
that is data security, the DOL has avoided some of the criticisms that 
other regulatory agencies have faced.10 But continued DOL inaction 
is no longer appropriate.  Rather, DOL action is now critical because 
ERISA preemption blocks state governments from regulating the 
data security of employee benefit plans, and no other federal regu-
latory scheme applies as directly to the issue as ERISA’s duty of 
prudence.11 
In constructing a regulatory scheme, the DOL has two realistic 
options. First, it might assume a reactive approach, relying solely on 
its enforcement authority under ERISA sections 502(a)(2) and 
502(a)(5) to shape the duty of prudence’s data security requirements 
through post-breach lawsuits.12 Second, it might undertake a proac-
tive approach, using its rulemaking authority under ERISA section 
505 to give concrete guidance to fiduciaries grappling with data se-
curity.13 This Article argues that the DOL should take a proactive 
approach. Simply put, quantifying the damages of a data breach is 
an inexact science at best, meaning that post-breach lawsuits are un-
likely to compensate participants or create adequate incentives for 
fiduciaries to protect data.14 Although a proactive regulation would 
                                                                                                         
 10  See infra Section IV.B (describing problems with the reactive regulatory 
approaches that other agencies, such as the Federal Trade Commission, have 
adopted). 
 11  See infra Part III (exploring the regulatory vacuum that exists at both the 
state and federal levels with respect to the data security practices of employee 
benefit plans). 
 12  ERISA § 502(a)(2), (5). 
 13  Id. § 505. 
 14  See David W. Opderbeck, Cybersecurity, Data Breaches, and the Eco-
nomic Loss Doctrine in the Payment Card Industry, 75 MD. L. REV. 935, 937–38 
(2016) (“Most of these [data breach damage] cases have failed at the pleading 
stage. On the consumer side, the problem is that any direct losses usually are 
reimbursed by the credit card issuer and any potential future losses are 
speculative.”). 
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still run into this “betrayal without a remedy” situation,15 it at least 
would provide the type of guidance fiduciaries need to avoid a 
breach in the first place, thus making compensation and future de-
terrence less necessary. 
Parts I and II of this Article provide background information, 
describing the modern data security crisis, the likely application of 
ERISA’s duty of prudence to data security matters, and the DOL’s 
ability to police violations. Part III offers perspective on why con-
tinued inactivity by the DOL is inappropriate with respect to data 
security, given the regulatory vacuum that currently exists in the 
area. Finally, Part IV proposes a proactive regulatory approach for 
DOL to adopt that will give fiduciaries substantial guidance with 
respect to their data security obligations. The full text of the pro-
posed regulation is included as an Appendix. 
I. OUR MODERN DATA SECURITY CRISIS 
Creating a smarter data security scheme begins with understand-
ing the technological and legal landscape in which businesses oper-
ate. In short, ERISA fiduciaries face threats from everywhere—out-
siders and insiders alike might steal or otherwise be careless with 
sensitive data. Fortunately for the DOL, it is not starting from 
scratch; it can look to the experiences of other agencies and private 
litigants when designing its regulatory scheme for ERISA fiduciar-
ies. This Part explores the threats modern companies face and the 
legal system’s responses to those threats. 
A. The Threats to Sensitive Data 
All employee benefit plans—retirement and welfare plans 
alike—require fiduciaries to maintain, use, and share large amounts 
of sensitive participant data.16 Although the maintenance of these 
records, whether in paper or electronic form, allows fiduciaries and 
                                                                                                         
 15  Susan Harthill, The Supreme Court Fills a Gaping Hole: CIGNA Corp. v. 
Amara Clarifies the Scope of Equitable Relief Under ERISA, 45 J. MARSHALL L. 
REV. 767, 770 (2012). ERISA literature often uses the phrase “betrayal without a 
remedy” to describe a situation in which ERISA’s remedial scheme under sec-
tion 502, combined with its broad preemption doctrine, leaves harmed partici-
pants unable to recover any damages for a fiduciary’s wrongful acts. See id. at 
770–71; see also Allinder v. Inter-City Prods. Corp., 152 F.3d 544, 553 (6th Cir. 
1998). 
 16  See 2016 REPORT, supra note 9, at 4–5. 
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their agents (including third-party service providers) to provide fast, 
efficient services to plan participants, this convenience comes with 
risk.17 Simply put, this information is valuable.18 Bad actors subject 
fiduciaries (and other holders of data) to a relentless onslaught of 
attacks by trying to steal the data for their own purposes.19 Moreo-
ver, these bad actors come from a variety of sources and, although 
outside attackers represent the most obvious threat to sensitive data, 
a company’s own employees or other insiders also might seek to 
steal the information.20 
                                                                                                         
 17  Many publications refer explicitly to “cybersecurity” when discussing 
modern threats to sensitive data. See, e.g., id. But this terminology only encom-
passes attempts to secure digital data, whereas the term “data security” or “infor-
mation security” includes attempts to protect both digital and non-digital data. See 
Jackie Buchy, Cyber Security vs IT Security: Is There a Difference?, GEO. MASON 
U. SCH. BUS.: TECH & CYBER BLOG (June 30, 2016), http://business.gmu.edu/ 
blog/tech/2016/06/30/cyber-securit-it-security-difference/. This Article focuses 
on data security solutions, given that an emphasis purely on cybersecurity would 
fail to address real-world threats to physical records. See, e.g., J.P. Turner & Co., 
LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 395, 98 S.E.C. Docket 1729, 2010 WL 2000509, 
at *4 (ALJ May 19, 2010) (describing a situation in which an employee for an 
Atlanta-based securities broker left boxes containing thousands of customer rec-
ords on the street curb outside his home). 
 18  See, e.g., Alexandra Ossola, Why Do Hackers Want Your Health Data?, 
POPULAR SCI. (Sept. 10, 2015), https://www.popsci.com/why-do-hackers-want-
your-health-data. 
 19  See, e.g., Caroline Hummer & Jim Finkle, Your Medical Record Is Worth 
More to Hackers than Your Credit Card, REUTERS (Sept. 24, 2014, 2:25 PM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cybersecurity-hospitals/your-medical-record-
is-worth-more-to-hackers-than-your-credit-card-idUSKCN0HJ21I20140924 
(noting an uptick in the number of cyberattacks on health plans); John A. Vogt et 
al., Data Breach Risks for 401(k) and Retirement Plans, JONES DAY (Apr. 2017), 
https://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/bf7cbd9d-8bfa-47f1-9417-46f45cb 
b3bf8/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/6b8622fd-3e6f-48a8-92ca-519e1f 
3b47ea/Data%20Breach%20Risks%20for%20401(k)%20and%20Retirement 
%20Plans.pdf (describing an increase in cyberattacks against retirement plans). 
 20  See PONEMON INST., 2017 COST OF DATA BREACH STUDY 14 (2017), 
https://public.dhe.ibm.com/common/ssi/ecm/se/en/sel03130wwen/security-ibm-
security-services-se-research-report-sel03130wwen-20180122.pdf [hereinafter 
DATA BREACH COSTS] (finding that “malicious or criminal attacks” are the most 
common cause of data breaches, including those by employees, contractors, or 
other insiders). 
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Further, the motivations driving these attackers vary almost as 
widely as their identities. For example, private medical data—like a 
healthcare plan might keep—is surprisingly valuable to criminals 
who might use it for stealing identities, committing insurance fraud, 
or even obtaining prescription drugs for resale on the black market.21 
Besides medical records, sensitive plan data can include other items, 
such as social security numbers, that criminals can use for identity 
theft.22 And of course, hackers might obtain lists of passwords and 
usernames or e-mail accounts that participants use to manage or 
check on their plan benefits—login information that the participants 
might reuse for any number of other online accounts.23 
Compounding the bleakness of this scene is the reality that, at 
least on some level, data breaches are unavoidable.24 Data thieves 
have the time, money, and tools to attack businesses relentlessly—
in fact, hackers released around 357 million new variations of mali-
cious programs in 2016 alone.25 The most malignant of these pro-
grams exploit existing but unknown vulnerabilities in companies’ 
security measures, leaving those seeking to defend against data theft 
to constantly fight yesterday’s battles.26 Moreover, it seems almost 
                                                                                                         
 21  Ossola, supra note 18. 
 22  See generally Hummer & Finkle, supra note 19 (“Stolen health credentials 
can go for $10 each, about 10 or 20 times the value of a U.S. credit card number.”); 
Maggie O’Neill, Hackers Stole More Social Security Numbers than Credit Card 
Numbers Last Year—Looting $16.8 Billion, DAILY MAIL (Feb. 22, 2018, 5:13 
PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-5423941/Hackers-stole-So-
cial-Security-numbers-2017.html (describing hackers’ attempts to steal social se-
curity numbers so they can take funds from the victims’ accounts, such as bank 
and pension accounts). 
 23  See Ted Samson, Study Finds High Rate of Password Reuse Among Users, 
INFOWORLD (Feb. 10, 2011), https://www.infoworld.com/article/2623504/data-
security/study-finds-high-rate-of-password-reuse-among-users.html (describing 
the prevalence of “password reuse,” in which a person uses the same login infor-
mation for multiple services). 
 24  See 2016 REPORT, supra note 9, at 1 (“Cyber experts say that it is not a 
question of if you will have a cyber-attack, rather it is a question of when.”). 
 25  WORLD ECON. FORUM, THE GLOBAL RISKS REPORT 2018, at 14 (13th ed. 
2018), www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GRR18_Report.pdf. 
 26  See Dan Goodin, Zero-Day Attacks Are Meaner, More Rampant than We 
Ever Thought, ARS TECHNICA (Oct. 16, 2012, 3:15 PM), https://arstechnica.com/ 
information-technology/2012/10/zero-day-attacks-are-meaner-and-more-plenti-
ful-than-thought/ (describing how hackers weaponize undetected vulnerabilities, 
drawing out cyber-attacks for months or years). 
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inevitable that sophisticated criminals will someday use advanced 
artificial intelligence capabilities to steal sensitive records.27 Under 
these circumstances, it is no wonder that so many high profile targets 
have suffered data breaches, including federal agencies such as the 
State Department, the Internal Revenue Service, and even the Na-
tional Security Agency.28 These factors all lead to the inescapable 
conclusion that the question is not whether a business will suffer a 
breach, but rather when the breach will occur.29 
B. Legal Responses to the Threats 
Data breaches present somewhat of a legal quandary. Many 
data breaches clearly involve bad actors: criminals who victimize 
companies and individuals by stealing sensitive data from them.30 
                                                                                                         
 27  See George Dvorsky, New Report on Emerging AI Paints a Grim Future, 
GIZMODO (Feb. 21, 2018, 1:29 PM), https://gizmodo.com/new-report-on-ai-risks-
paints-a-grim-future-1823191087; MILES BRUNDAGE ET AL., THE MALICIOUS 
USE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: FORECASTING, PREVENTION, AND MITIGATION 
21–28 (2018), https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/3d82daa4-97fe-4096-9c6b-37 
6b92c619de/downloads/1c6q2kc4v_50335.pdf (describing the potential mali-
cious applications of AI to online data). 
 28  See, e.g., Nir Kshetri, Why the IRS Was Hacked Again and What the Feds 
Can Do About It, CONVERSATION (Feb. 16, 2016, 5:50 AM), https://theconversa-
tion.com/why-the-irs-was-just-hacked-again-and-what-the-feds-can-do-about-it-
54524; Evan Perez & Shimon Prokupecz, Sources: State Dept. Hack the ‘Worst 
Ever,’ CNN (Mar. 10, 2015, 7:49 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2015/03/10/poli-
tics/state-department-hack-worst-ever/index.html. Although the National Secu-
rity Agency’s most publicized breach came at the hands of Edward Snowden in 
2013, it has since faced several other incidents in which insiders stole or attempted 
to steal highly confidential data. See Scott Shane, Suspect Offers Guilty Plea in 
Stealing Trove of Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2018, at A16.  
 29  Opderbeck, supra note 14, at 936 (“It is not a question of if you will suffer 
a data breach; it is a question of when.”); see also Justin (Gus) Hurwitz, Data 
Security and the FTC’s UnCommon Law, 101 IOWA L. REV. 955, 957 (2016) 
(quoting a former FBI director as saying, “There are two kinds of big companies 
in the United States. There are those who’ve been hacked . . . and those who don’t 
know they’ve been hacked. . . .”). 
 30  See Data Breaches 101: How They Happen, What Gets Stolen, and Where 
It All Goes, TREND MICRO (Aug. 10, 2018), https://www.trendmicro.com/ 
vinfo/us/security/news/cyber-attacks/data-breach-101 (describing different sorts 
of data breaches).  
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An obvious policy goal of any legal system is the desire to hold peo-
ple accountable for their own actions,31 which would imply that our 
focus should be on punishing data thieves and trying to recover their 
ill-gotten gains. Consequently, the federal government and state 
governments all outlaw data theft.32 On the other hand, though, the 
problem with focusing solely on active wrongdoers in the data se-
curity context is that they are often difficult to locate or prosecute, 
especially when they operate from overseas.33 More importantly, fo-
cusing only on after-the-breach punishment of data thieves does not 
place enough emphasis on trying to prevent breaches in the first 
place; the only value it generates in this regard comes in the form of 
(arguably weak) deterrence.34 Thus, much of the legal push in the 
                                                                                                         
 31  See generally The Nature of Law, STAN. ENCYC. OF PHILOSOPHY, 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/lawphil-nature/ (last updated Aug. 7, 2015) (de-
scribing the philosophical underpinnings of the legal system and the objective of 
using law to guide human behavior).  
 32  For example, the federal government has the power to prosecute most (if 
not all, given interstate commerce considerations) data theft involving the use of 
computers under 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012). Additionally, every state has laws pro-
hibiting data theft, including theft via hacking. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 815.01–
815.07 (2018); see also Computer Crime Statutes, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLA-
TURES (June 14, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-
information-technology/computer-hacking-and-unauthorized-access-laws.aspx 
(listing state laws in all fifty states that address hacking, unauthorized access, 
computer trespass, viruses, and malware).  
 33  See Roger A. Grimes, Why It’s So Hard to Prosecute Cyber Criminals, 
CSO (Dec. 6, 2016, 3:00 AM), https://www.csoonline.com/article/3147398/data-
protection/why-its-so-hard-to-prosecute-cyber-criminals.html. 
 34  Legal theory, particularly in the context of criminal law, recognizes two 
types of deterrence. See Brian Jacobs, The Role of Publicity in Sentencing, 
FORBES (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2017/10/23/the-
role-of-publicity-in-sentencing/#4fb8bd153e5c. General deterrence refers to the 
expectation that punishing one person will discourage others from engaging in the 
same behavior. See id. Individual deterrence refers to the probability that a pun-
ishment will discourage an individual from repeating his or her behavior in the 
future. See id. For purposes of data theft policy, general deterrence is more im-
portant, given the number of potential thieves; even if one hacker ceases his or 
her unlawful activities, another is likely to replace him or her. And while punish-
ing data thieves almost definitely produces at least some general deterrence, it is 
insufficient to deter all such criminals—especially the worst offenders—given the 
likelihood that they operate outside the effective reach of law enforcement. See 
supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
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data security realm is on regulating the businesses that keep sensi-
tive data—businesses that are themselves the primary victims in 
many data breaches.35 
To be clear, businesses certainly have market incentives to avoid 
data breaches even in the absence of regulation.36 Although data 
breach costs decreased from 2016 to 2017, a recent study of 419 
large, global companies revealed average costs of $3.62 million per 
breach.37 A company that suffers a data breach can expect to suffer 
both direct costs, such as the expenses associated with hiring outside 
forensics experts to analyze the breach, and indirect costs, such as 
reputational harm and resulting customer loss.38 A potential issue, 
however, is that these market incentives often do not sufficiently 
drive businesses to protect their data; customers bear some of the 
risk in any breach, meaning the businesses themselves do not face 
the full costs of data theft.39 Although this arguably is an appropriate 
outcome—embodying the idea that everybody should share some of 
the risk—businesses are undeniably in the best position to prevent 
data breaches.40 Therefore, people have tried to use the legal system, 
through both private lawsuits and direct regulation, to push the full 
costs of data breaches onto the companies that suffer them, which 
may in turn incentivize those companies to take additional precau-
tions.41 
                                                                                                         
 35  See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING PERSONAL INFORMATION: A 
GUIDE FOR BUSINESSES (2016). 
 36  See DATA BREACH COSTS, supra note 20, at 5–7 (discussing the average 
costs of data breaches to companies). 
 37  Id. at 1.  
 38  Id. at 29. 
 39  Nathan Alexander Sales, Regulating Cyber-Security, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 
1503, 1508, 1519–21 (2013). 
 40  Id. at 1517–18 (describing the economics view that the law should allocate 
risks to low-cost avoiders—i.e., those who are in the best positions to mitigate or 
avoid risks). 
 41  See generally id. at 1533–35 (discussing the challenges of applying tradi-
tional tort law to cybersecurity issues); Elaine F. Harwell, No Signs of Slowing 
Down: Privacy Litigation Update, FOR DEF., Oct. 10, 2017, at 91, 93, https:// 
www.selmanlaw.com/sites/default/files/FTD-1710-Harwell.pdf (noting that ma-
jor data breaches are the likely cause of an increase in privacy litigation and reg-
ulatory enforcement actions). 
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To date, attempts to shift data breach costs onto businesses via 
private litigation have been limited because of the difficulties asso-
ciated with quantifying and tracing the harms of breaches.42 Plain-
tiffs who try to recover from companies in the aftermath of data 
breaches face a number of legal hurdles, each of which has the po-
tential to derail their claims. For starters, circuits are split over 
whether individuals suffer a sufficiently concrete injury and there-
fore have standing to sue a business that suffered a breach when the 
individual’s sole injury is the mere loss of data resulting from the 
breach.43 Even if an individual plaintiff survives the standing re-
quirement, he or she is hardly ensured a victory.44 First, the plaintiff 
in a standard negligence case must prove the defendant was negli-
gent in how it handled the sensitive data.45 Second, a plaintiff in any 
data breach litigation is going to have issues showing causation, 
given that he or she might have also lost his or her data in any num-
ber of other breaches of unrelated companies or sources, including 
                                                                                                         
 42  See generally Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: 
A Theory of Data-Breach Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV. 737, 739–46 (2018) (discussing 
difficulties courts face in conceptualizing harms posed by data breaches and how 
those difficulties lead to limited redress for plaintiffs). 
 43  See Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 273–74 (4th Cir. 2017) (listing the 
circuit courts that have analyzed the issue, along with their holdings). The Sixth, 
Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits have found that an increased risk of future iden-
tity theft is sufficient to confer standing, while the First, Third, and Fourth Circuits 
have rejected that position. Id. Note that Beck does not cite to the D.C. Circuit’s 
decision finding standing, because the D.C. Circuit issued its opinion six months 
after the Fourth Circuit issued Beck. See Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 
626 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 44  Although the number of data breaches has grown alarmingly with time, the 
litigation framework for these cases remains underdeveloped, given that the cases 
that survive the standing requirement tend to settle. See Harwell, supra note 41, 
at 93. 
 45  See Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317, 1325–26 (11th Cir. 2012) 
(listing negligence claim elements and addressing sufficiency of the pleadings in 
a data security context). 
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yet-undiscovered breaches.46 Third, some courts have used a theory 
known as the economic loss doctrine to bar plaintiffs’ tort claims, 
given that their claims arise “solely in economic damages unaccom-
panied by physical or property damage.”47 In short, being a data 
breach victim is miserable, but being a data breach victim trying to 
sue the company that lost the data is even worse. 
In contrast, governmental agencies that regulate businesses’ data 
security practices can avoid many of the traps that afflict private lit-
igants, such as the need to show a concrete injury-in-fact stemming 
from a data breach.48 At the federal level, “the most prominent reg-
ulatory agency” to address data security is the Federal Trade Com-
mission (“FTC”).49 The FTC’s strategy has been to bring enforce-
ment actions against companies that suffer breaches using its author-
ity to regulate “unfair . . . acts or practices,”50 under the theory that 
lax data security practices are unfair to customers.51 Of course, the 
FTC is not the only federal entity that seeks to regulate data security; 
other governmental bodies also regulate this area and take varying 
                                                                                                         
 46  See id. at 1327; Harwell, supra note 41, at 93. Notably, issues relating to 
causation and damages might also prevent class certification, given that 
Rule 23(b)(3) requires common questions of law or fact to predominate over in-
dividual matters. See, e.g., In re Hannaford Bros. Co. Customer Data Sec. Breach 
Litig., 293 F.R.D. 21, 30, 33–34 (D. Me. 2013) (denying class certification in a 
data breach case because the plaintiffs did not produce expert testimony regarding 
the total damages the proposed class allegedly suffered). It is unlikely individual 
plaintiffs would pursue their claims in the absence of a class, given the relatively 
low dollar amounts at stake per person in a data breach. 
 47  Sovereign Bank v. BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 533 F. 3d 162, 175 (3d Cir. 
2008) (quoting Adams v. Copper Beach Townhome Cmtys., L.P., 816 A.2d 301, 
305 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003)). A fuller description of the economic loss doctrine is 
well beyond the scope of this Article; it is enough to know that it poses another 
hurdle to prospective data breach plaintiffs. See generally Opderbeck, supra note 
14, at 944–46. 
 48  See e.g., Michael Hooker & Jason Pill, You’ve Been Hacked, and Now 
You’re Being Sued: The Developing World of Cybersecurity Litigation, FLA. B.J., 
July/Aug. 2016, at 30, 38 (citing R.T. Jones Capital Equities Mgmt., Exchange 
Act Release No. 4204, 2015 WL 5560846 (Sept. 22, 2015)) (discussing how the 
SEC brought an enforcement action even though the hacked company’s clients 
suffered no actual economic harm).  
 49  Hooker & Pill, supra note 48, at 38. 
 50  15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2012). 
 51  See id.; Hurwitz, supra note 29, at 964–66. 
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approaches to the issue. For example, the Department of Health and 
Human Services governs the data security practices of health plans 
and providers by means of a complex set of regulations under the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”).52 
Likewise, state legislatures regulate data security, with every 
single state having passed breach notification laws that require busi-
nesses and government agencies to inform the public about security 
breaches involving private customer data.53 State administrative 
agencies are also beginning to play a role in the data security 
realm—for example, the New York State Department of Financial 
Services recently promulgated strict regulations imposing numerous 
data security requirements on financial institutions, such as mandat-
ing they designate Chief Information Security Officers.54 In short, 
while other government agencies like the FTC have attempted to 
regulate data security, the DOL has not, thereby leaving a regulatory 
void with respect to the security of data in employee benefit plans.55 
II. ERISA’S FIDUCIARY STRUCTURE 
ERISA’s fiduciary obligations are the heart of its regulatory 
scheme.56 ERISA designates persons holding trusted positions in the 
administration of an employee benefit plan as fiduciaries,57 requir-
                                                                                                         
 52  Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), 
Pub. L. No. 104–191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 18, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.). The security and privacy regulations under HIPAA 
are available at 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164(a), (e) (2018). 
 53  Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, 
(Sept. 29, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-infor-
mation-technology/security-breach-notification-laws.aspx.  
 54  N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, §§ 500.0–500.23 (2018). 
 55  See infra Part III. Though beyond the scope of this Article, companies op-
erating abroad also face regulation by foreign governments, such as the European 
Union. See, e.g., Daniel K. Alvarez, The EU General Data Protection Regulation 
Is Coming—Is Your Client Ready?, PRAC. LAW., Oct. 2017, at 19; Tal Z. Zarsky, 
Incompatible: The GDPR in the Age of Big Data, 47 SETON HALL L. REV. 995 
(2017). 
 56  See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) § 2(b), 
29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2012) (“It is hereby declared to be the policy of [ERISA] to 
protect . . . the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their bene-
ficiaries . . . by establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation 
for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans . . . .”). 
 57  See id. §§ 3(16), (21)(A), (38), 402(a)(1). 
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ing them to follow certain standards when performing their obliga-
tions to the plan.58 Ultimately, one of these duties—the duty of pru-
dence—forms the basis for concluding that fiduciaries must take 
steps to protect sensitive plan data. Section II.A explores the duty of 
prudence both generally and in the context of data security, and Sec-
tion II.B addresses the DOL’s authority to enforce the provisions of 
ERISA, including its ability to assess fines for noncompliance. 
A. The Duty of Prudence 
ERISA’s duty of prudence is paramount in the context of data 
security.59 It requires fiduciaries to carry out their obligations to the 
plan “with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circum-
stances” that a prudent man “familiar with such matters” would uti-
lize.60 Importantly, prudence does not require a good outcome; a fi-
duciary might behave prudently even if he or she does something 
that ends badly.61 A good illustration of this principle arises in the 
context of underperforming investments in pension plans: federal 
                                                                                                         
 58  See id. §§ 404–06. 
 59  Three other obligations might have at least some relevance to the data se-
curity issue. First, the exclusive benefit rule almost certainly prohibits fiduciaries 
from selling participant data or using it for purposes other than providing benefits. 
See id. § 404(a)(1)(A). Second, fiduciary might face liability if it knows of a co-
fiduciary’s failure to safeguard plan data but does nothing to remedy the situation. 
See id. § 405(a)(3). Third, fiduciaries must comply with plan provisions expressly 
relating to data security, provided doing so is prudent. See id. § 404(a)(1)(D); 
Herman v. NationsBank Tr. Co., 126 F.3d 1354, 1358 (11th Cir. 1997). 
 60  ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B).  
 61  See, e.g., Tatum v. RJR Pension Inv. Comm., 761 F.3d 346, 369 (4th Cir. 
2014) (explaining that the duty of prudence does not impose liability on fiduciar-
ies who use “reasoned decision-making process[es],” even if their decisions “yield 
outcome[s] that in hindsight prove . . . less than ‘optimal’”); Bd. of Tr. of City of 
Birmingham Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Comerica Bank, 767 F. Supp. 2d 793, 802 (E.D. 
Mich. 2011) (“The ultimate outcome of an investment is not proof of impru-
dence.”). 
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courts routinely affirm that the decision-making process, as opposed 
to the outcome of a particular investment, determines prudence.62 
Another relevant component of the duty of prudence is the duty 
to monitor third parties that provide services to the plan. This duty 
to monitor relies on the idea that fiduciaries can—and do—delegate 
plan administrative tasks to various service providers. But, in any 
principal-agent relationship, a prudent principal will take ongoing 
steps to ensure the agent performs his or her duties with care.63 
These steps include assessing potential agents before ever hiring 
them,64 as well as continually reviewing their post-hiring work.65 
Thus, ERISA fiduciaries who seek to act prudently must take similar 
steps with respect to the third-party service providers they hire as 
agents, even if those service providers are not themselves fiduciar-
ies.66 
Although nothing in ERISA expressly defines the protection of 
sensitive data as a “dut[y] with respect to a plan”67 and no case law 
                                                                                                         
 62  As the District of Hawaii explained: 
Virtually every investment entails some degree of risk, and 
even the most carefully evaluated investments can fail while 
unpromising investments may succeed. The application of 
ERISA’s prudence standard does not depend upon the ultimate 
outcome of an investment, but upon the prudence of the fiduci-
aries under the circumstances prevailing when they make their 
decision and in light of the alternatives available to them. 
Marshall v. Glass/Metal Ass’n & Glaziers & Glassworkers Pension Plan, 507 F. 
Supp. 378, 384 (D. Haw. 1980). 
 63  See, e.g., EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., DEP’T OF LABOR, FIELD ASSIS-
TANCE BULLETIN NO. 2015–02 (2015); see also Michael C. Jensen & William H. 
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Owner-
ship Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976) (describing the monitoring, bond-
ing, and residual costs that principals incur to control their agents). 
 64  See, e.g., Donovan v. Mazzola, 716 F.2d 1226, 1233–34 (9th Cir. 1983). 
 65  Cf. Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 135 S. Ct. 1823, 1827–29 (2015) (holding that 
an ongoing failure to remove imprudent investment choices from a plan menu 
tolled the relevant statute of limitations under ERISA); Colleen Medill, Regulat-
ing ERISA Fiduciary Outsourcing, 102 IOWA L. REV. 505, 520–21 (2017) (mak-
ing the point that ERISA should be interpreted to require fiduciaries to monitor 
co-fiduciaries to whom they outsource their duties). 
 66  Ellen Mondress, Contracting Tips of ERISA Plans, BENEFITS MAG., May 
2012, at 39. 
 67  Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) § 404(a)(1), 
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2012). 
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addresses the issue, ERISA’s duty of prudence almost certainly re-
quires fiduciaries to attempt to guard plan data.68 Simply put, a fi-
duciary cannot operate an employee benefit plan modernly without 
collecting and using participant data. Pension plans must have ac-
cess to account information, health plans must have access to medi-
cal records, and all plans must have access to information that iden-
tifies individual participants.69 No reasonable person “familiar with 
such matters” would ever consider not taking any steps to protect 
sensitive data.70 And, along these same lines, the duty must require 
fiduciaries to inspect the data security practices of third-party ser-
vice providers they hire because no reasonable person would entrust 
somebody to work with sensitive data without first determining that 
he or she will try to keep it safe.71 In short, the question is not 
whether the duty of prudence requires the protection of plan data, 
but rather how fiduciaries can comply with the obligation.72 
                                                                                                         
 68  A few unreported opinions have analyzed data breaches involving ERISA 
plans, but none has analyzed the duty of prudence. See In re Premera Blue Cross 
Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 3:15-md-02633, 2017 WL 539578 (D. Or. 
Feb. 9, 2017); Anthem, Inc. Data Breach Litig., No. 15–MD–02617–LHK, 2016 
WL 3029783 (N.D. Cal. May 27, 2016). The DOL’s 2016 report does not ex-
pressly say the duty of prudence entails a requirement to protect sensitive data, 
but it at least hints at the issue by using the word “prudent” three times. See 2016 
REPORT, supra note 9 at 5, 23. 
 69  See 2016 REPORT, supra note 9, at 7–8 (describing information retained by 
benefits plan providers).  
 70  See ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B). 
 71  See Ariel Gaknoki, Cybersecurity and ERISA: Fiduciary Obligations to 
Safeguard Plan Participants’ Data, TRUCKER HUSS 1, 2 (June 2017), 
https://www.truckerhuss.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/2017-06_fid_ob_ 
data.pdf (“[T]he Bulletin has been interpreted more broadly to establish the re-
quirement of prudence in service provider selections, including prudence in the 
selection of a service provider that maintains electronic plan data in order to keep 
that plan data private and secure.”). 
 72  See generally id. Undoubtedly, some future litigant will try to argue that 
ERISA does not obligate fiduciaries to protect plan data. But surely ERISA must 
involve some duty to protect data the fiduciary uses while operating the plan; con-
cluding otherwise would seemingly lead to the absurd result that a fiduciary could 
purposefully make private information publicly available without violating 
ERISA’s duty to act as a reasonable person when carrying out plan duties. Id.  
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B. The DOL’s Enforcement Role 
ERISA’s fiduciary duties are meaningless without a working en-
forcement mechanism. Although the DOL, Internal Revenue Ser-
vice, Department of Justice, and private litigants all play a role in 
enforcing ERISA,73 participant lawsuits and DOL actions serve as 
the primary means of ensuring fiduciary compliance.74 Within its 
role as the primary regulatory agency charged with enforcing 
ERISA, the DOL can take both proactive and reactive enforcement 
actions. On the proactive side of the equation, the DOL has rule-
making authority to prescribe any regulation it finds “necessary or 
appropriate” to fulfill ERISA’s purposes.75 As part of this authority, 
the DOL can regulate the plan-related books and records fiduciaries 
maintain, which certainly could permit it to require fiduciaries to 
create records relating to their data security practices.76 
On the reactive side of the DOL’s authority, it can bring actions 
against fiduciaries and other parties that violate ERISA’s provisions 
and the DOL’s own regulations.77 The problem with this enforce-
ment power, however, is that the DOL likely cannot prove damages 
by, or recover adequate damages from, a fiduciary that acts impru-
dently with respect to data security.78 As with private litigants 
demonstrating standing in data breach lawsuits,79 the problem the 
DOL faces in seeking monetary recovery against a fiduciary with 
poor data security practices is measuring concrete harm—courts 
                                                                                                         
 73  See Dana M. Muir, Decentralized Enforcement to Combat Financial 
Wrongdoing in Pensions: What Types of Watchdogs Are Necessary to Keep the 
Foxes out of the Henhouse?, 53 AM. BUS. L.J. 33, 68 (2016). 
 74  See ERISA §§ 2(b), 502(a)(1)–(3), (5). 
 75  Id. § 505. 
 76  Id. 
 77  See id. § 502. 
 78  See Solove & Citron, supra note 42, at 737 (discussing the difficulty of 
quantifying monetary harms from a data breach). 
 79  See generally supra notes 45–49 and accompanying text. 
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have struggled, and will likely continue to struggle, with quantifying 
the damages that consumers suffer as a result of data breaches.80 
This inability to impose monetary damages—itself an example 
of a “betrayal without a remedy” under ERISA’s labyrinthian reme-
dial framework—limits the DOL’s ability to push the costs of a data 
breach onto the offending fiduciaries, reducing some of the incen-
tives those fiduciaries otherwise might have to scrutinize and im-
prove their own data security practices.81 Even civil and criminal 
penalties under ERISA have limited potential to apply in data breach 
scenarios. First, civil penalties by the DOL are entirely off the table. 
The DOL can only assess an amount equal to twenty percent of the 
amount recoverable as damages in an action,82 and twenty percent 
of $0 is still only $0. Second, although criminal penalties for data 
breaches can be indeterminate amounts not tied to quantifiable and 
                                                                                                         
 80  See generally Solove & Citron, supra note 42, at 737 (discussing the strug-
gles of courts to quantify the harms associated with data breaches, finding many 
of these struggles arise “from the fact that data-breach harms are intangible, risk-
oriented, and diffuse”). In their article, Professors Solove and Citron propose that 
courts ought to be more willing to quantify the harms resulting from data 
breaches, especially in light of the fact that courts quantify intangible types of 
harm in many other contexts. Id. at 746. Although courts might adopt this type of 
thinking in the future, it would require a dramatic change of course from their 
usual approach to data breach litigation. See id. at 785. And beyond the desire to 
maintain consistency with past opinions, courts might have practical reasons for 
wanting to avoid recognizing damages arising from data breaches—for example, 
recognizing the ability to recover damages might also encourage strike suits. See 
id. at 782. 
 81  Harthill, supra note 15, at 770–71 (discussing the problems that arise when 
ERISA preempts state laws but leaves harmed participants without any ability to 
recover damages, known as a betrayal without a remedy); see supra notes 38–42 
and accompanying text (discussing how legal damages can incentivize companies 
to better consider the harms that might result from their lax data security prac-
tices—i.e., causing them to internalize the externalities they might otherwise cre-
ate). 
 82  Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), § 502(l)(1)–
(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(l)(1)–(2) (2012).  
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recoverable damages, only the Department of Justice can seek these 
penalties.83 
In short, the DOL—the main regulatory agency tasked with en-
forcing ERISA—has no ability to impose monetary costs on fiduci-
aries with lax data security practices. None of this is to conclude that 
DOL enforcement actions should not play any role with respect to 
regulating employee benefit plans providers’ data security practices. 
The DOL can always pursue equitable remedies, such as asking a 
court to remove a fiduciary that does not adequately protect partici-
pant data.84 But, the point is to recognize the limits the DOL would 
face under the current statutory scheme if it were to adopt a purely 
reactive approach to regulation.85 If the DOL hopes to have any im-
pact on the data security practices of ERISA fiduciaries, it needs to 
adopt a proactive approach that gives fiduciaries concrete guidance 
they can use to develop and assess their policies and procedures. 
                                                                                                         
 83  See id. § 501(a). The other problem with relying on criminal fines to serve 
as a major deterrent to inadequate data security practices is that the Department 
of Justice must show the breach of prudence was willful, which would require a 
showing the fiduciary purposefully had lax data security. See id.; cf. United States 
v. Phillips, 19 F.3d 1565, 1576, 1584 (11th Cir. 1994) (requiring fiduciaries to 
“voluntarily, knowingly, and intentionally” engage in conduct for section 501 to 
apply). Beyond the burden of making a willfulness showing, it seems unwise to 
conclude the Department of Justice would have any ability or interest in becoming 
the chief regulator of employee benefit plans’ data security practices, a conclusion 
supported by the fact that Westlaw, as of January 20, 2019, reports only 199 opin-
ions even involving section 501. 
 84  ERISA § 409(a). 
 85  Congress could always resolve this problem by giving the DOL the ability 
to issue fines not tied to recoverable damages, much like the Department of Justice 
can do in criminal actions, at least with respect to situations (like data breaches) 
in which damages are non-quantifiable. For example, Congress could set a statu-
tory cap (either on a per-occurrence or per-participant basis) and then give the 
DOL flexibility to determine appropriate fines based on the severity of the fidu-
ciary’s misconduct. That said, there is no reason to expect Congress will act on 
the matter; this Article focuses solely on regulatory changes the DOL can make 
without Congressional action. 
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III. THE IMPORTANCE OF ERISA TO DATA SECURITY POLICY 
To date, surprisingly little case law addresses ERISA’s potential 
significance in the area of data security.86 This Part argues, however, 
that ERISA is more than just generally applicable to data security 
matters. In fact, it is vitally important given its unique applicability 
to employee benefit plans. As a result, the DOL must assume a 
stronger role in regulating fiduciaries’ data security practices. Sec-
tion III.A explores the possibility of ERISA preempting state laws 
that attempt to govern data privacy and security. Section III.B de-
scribes the lack of any other federal regulations governing employee 
benefit plans, leaving the DOL with the responsibility of addressing 
this void. 
A. ERISA Preemption of State Laws 
ERISA’s broad preemption doctrine removes authority to reg-
ulate employee benefits plans from the states and puts it in the hands 
of the federal government.87 Though ERISA’s statutory preemption 
rule is relatively brief, preempting state laws that “relate to any em-
ployee benefit plan,”88 the Supreme Court has repeatedly expanded 
on its meaning in high-profile cases, including its most recent ven-
ture into the area: Gobeille v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.89 In 
brief, ERISA preempts two categories of state laws.90 The first cat-
egory consists of any state law that acts “immediately and exclu-
sively upon ERISA plans” or that requires the existence of an 
ERISA plan for its operation.91 The second category includes state 
                                                                                                         
 86  Daniel O’Neil, Employee Benefit Plans and Data Security Issues, JACKSON 
LEWIS (Apr. 25, 2016), https://www.benefitslawadvisor.com/2016/04/articles/fi-
duciaryduties/employee-benefit-plans-and-data-security-issues/ (noting that 
scope of ERISA in area of data security remains uncertain, as it has yet to be 
addressed by courts). 
 87  ERISA § 514(a). 
 88  Id. 
 89  136 S. Ct. 936, 943 (2016). 
 90  Id. 
 91  Id. (quoting Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enf’t v. Dillingham Constr., 
N.A., 519 U.S. 316, 325 (1997)). 
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laws that impermissibly govern “central matter[s] of plan admin-
istration” or “interfere[] with nationally uniform plan administra-
tion.”92 
Applying these standards, the second category of ERISA 
preemption seems to cover most—if not all—state law claims, stat-
utes, and regulations purporting to govern the data security practices 
of employee benefit plans.93 First, ERISA likely preempts tort 
claims against plan fiduciaries in the aftermath of data breaches. As 
described before in Section II.A, the duty of prudence almost cer-
tainly requires fiduciaries to take at least some steps to protect plan 
data. A negligence claim against a plan fiduciary in the aftermath of 
a breach would effectively allege that the fiduciary was negligent in 
performing his or her duty to protect plan data, which is exactly the 
type of state-law claim to which ERISA’s preemption rule should 
apply.94 Therefore, these state-law tort claims infringe upon central 
matters of plan administration—i.e., the standards by which we 
judge fiduciaries’ conduct.95 
Likewise, ERISA arguably preempts the various breach notifi-
cation laws that states have enacted as laws that interfere with na-
tionally uniform plan administration. For example, if an employee 
benefit plan has participants in fifteen states, it might have to pro-
vide fifteen different types of notifications in the aftermath of a data 
breach affecting the plan.96 Moreover, the Gobeille Court empha-
sized ERISA’s “extensive” reporting, disclosure, and recordkeeping 
requirements, finding that compliance with these obligations is a 
                                                                                                         
 92  Id. (quoting Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 148 
(2001)). 
 93  In contrast, the first category of ERISA preemption likely would not apply 
to any existing state data security laws, given that none of them purports to rely 
upon or apply exclusively to employee benefit plans. See id. at 945. 
 94  Cf. Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1331 (5th Cir. 
1992) (holding that ERISA preempted a medical negligence claim against a 
claims reviewer that denied a treatment, resulting in the death of the plan partici-
pant’s unborn child). 
 95  This result becomes even more likely if the DOL adopts regulations for the 
protection of plan data, given that the state laws might conflict with the DOL’s 
own directives. 
 96  See Stephen Embry, State Data Breach Notification Laws Just Got Crazier, 
A.B.A: LAW TECH TODAY (Apr. 19, 2016), https://www.lawtechnologyto-
day.org/2016/04/crazy-quilt-work-state-data-breach-notification-laws-just-got-
crazier/. 
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central matter of plan administration.97 Accordingly, state laws re-
quiring disclosure of certain events to plan participants seem to in-
trude upon the authority of Congress and the DOL to regulate the 
disclosures that plans must make.98 Given the likely preemption of 
tort claims and breach notification laws, it seems highly probable 
that ERISA would further preempt any state laws or regulations that 
purport to govern with particularity the means by which plans must 
protect their data, such as those promulgated by the New York State 
Department of Financial Services.99 
Whether ERISA preemption of state-level data security laws is 
a beneficial result is debatable. Although it would create uniform 
national standards for employee benefit plans, it would simultane-
ously undercut states’ abilities to serve as “laboratories of democ-
racy”100 by trying new and innovative approaches to data security 
                                                                                                         
 97  Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 944. 
 98  Cf. id. at 945–46 (holding that ERISA preempted a Vermont law requiring 
healthcare plans to send reports about healthcare costs to a state agency). 
 99  See generally N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, §§ 500.0–500.23 
(2018). For an example of how the New York regulations would intrude upon the 
administration of an employee benefits plan, consider the requirement under sec-
tion 500.04 that every covered entity install a “Chief Information Security Of-
ficer” (“CISO”) in charge of overseeing implementation of the regulations. Id. 
§ 500.04. In essence, a CISO would become a “functional fiduciary” under 
ERISA section 3(21) by having “discretionary authority . . . in the administra-
tion” of the plan’s data protection strategy. Id.; Employee Retirement Income Se-
curity Act of 1974 (ERISA) § 3(21), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21) (2012). Thus, the New 
York regulations purport to tell covered employee benefit plans to install specific 
fiduciaries not required by ERISA’s own terms. 
 100  See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, 
J., dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single 
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel 
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”). 
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regulation.101 Regardless, ERISA preemption in this context cer-
tainly would be an impactful result.102 The preemption of state-level 
laws leaves a regulatory vacuum because existing ERISA remedies 
are likely inadequate, both in terms of relief offered to injured plan 
participants and deterrence of lax data security practices by fiduci-
aries.103 Consequently, there is a pressing need for the DOL to de-
velop standards in the area through proactive regulation. 
B. The Federal Regulatory Desert 
Although ERISA preempts state laws purporting to govern the 
conduct of fiduciaries, it does not excuse fiduciaries from their ob-
ligations under other federal laws.104 Nevertheless, no existing fed-
eral statutes or regulations compare to ERISA in terms of ability to 
govern the data security standards of employee benefit plans. For 
example, one of the most well-known federal laws relating to data 
security is the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act (“GLBA”), which applies 
                                                                                                         
 101  See generally Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 
902, 923, 927–31 (2009) (outlining the risks associated with federal preemption 
of state experimentation). 
 102  To be sure, it is not a foregone conclusion that the Supreme Court would 
find ERISA preempts all state-level data security laws—the Supreme Court’s 
preemption jurisprudence has evolved over time, and it has not always been con-
sistent with past opinions. See generally Edward A. Zelinsky, ERISA Preemption 
After Gobeille v. Liberty Mutual: Completing the Retrenchment of Shaw, 34 HOF-
STRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 301, 303–11 (2017). 
 103  See supra Section II.B (explaining the problems with quantifying damages 
resulting from a data breach). 
Given the potentially far-reaching effects of ERISA preemption, it is even 
more surprising that very little case law even considers its application. Only two 
cases explore in any real depth the possibility of ERISA preempting state laws 
applying to data security, and neither does so in a convincing manner—both ig-
nore the duty of prudence and its possible consequences to the analysis. See In re 
Premera Blue Cross Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 3:15-md-02633, 2017 
WL 539578, at *1, *16–20 (D. Or. Feb. 9, 2017); In re Anthem, Inc. Data Breach 
Litig., No. 15–MD–02617–LHK, 2016 WL 3029783, at *39–50 (N.D. Cal. May 
27, 2016). Both of these cases analyzed express plan language promising to guard 
plan data, determining whether those contractual promises were recoverable “ben-
efits” available under the plan. See In re Premera, 2017 WL 539578, at *18; In re 
Anthem, 2016 WL 3029783, at *43–44. Moreover, there is a lack of academic 
literature in the area, probably caused by the fact that data law as a field is rela-
tively young, and both data law and ERISA are specialty practice areas. 
 104  Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) § 514(d), 29 
U.S.C. § 1144(d) (2012). 
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to various actors in the financial industry.105 By its own terms, how-
ever, the GLBA only applies to nonpublic consumer information.106 
Even if employees who participate in pension plans sponsored by 
covered entities arguably fit within the statutory definition of “con-
sumer,”107 the regulatory agencies tasked with rulemaking under the 
GLBA tend to exempt participants in employee benefit plans.108 
And, in any case, the GLBA does not apply to businesses outside 
the financial industry, such as health insurers or administrative ser-
vice providers.109 
Likewise, HIPAA is also not a good substitute for regulating the 
data security practices of employee benefit plans. To be clear, 
healthcare plans are covered entities subject to the data privacy reg-
ulations under HIPAA.110 But that means HIPAA governs only a 
subset of all employee benefit plans; it completely ignores pension 
plans and many types of welfare benefit plans. Moreover, HIPAA 
                                                                                                         
 105  Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 
(2012) (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.). 
 106  See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 6801(b) (2012) (requiring specific regulatory agen-
cies to adopt standards for protecting “customer records and information”); see 
also 17 C.F.R. § 248.30 (2018) (requiring certain types of investment intermedi-
aries to protect “customer records and information”). The GLBA seems to use the 
terms customer and consumer interchangeably, though most references in the stat-
utory provisions are to consumers. 
 107  See 15 U.S.C. § 6809(9) (“The term ‘consumer’ means an individual who 
obtains, from a financial institution, financial products or services which are to be 
used primarily for personal, family, or household purposes . . . .”). 
 108  See 17 C.F.R. § 248.3(g)(2)(viii) (“An individual is not your [customer] 
solely because he or she is a participant or a beneficiary of an employee benefit 
plan that you sponsor or for which you act as a trustee or fiduciary.”); see also 16 
C.F.R. § 313.3(e)(2)(viii) (2018) (providing an identical rule for the financial 
companies expressly subject to the Federal Trade Commission’s authority under 
the GLBA). 
Notably, the GLBA and its implementing regulations require covered third-
party providers of financial services to guard plan data they receive from pension 
plans. See supra note 106. So even though the GLBA might not expressly apply 
to the plans themselves, the ERISA Advisory Council was incorrect in its 2016 
report when it implied that existing federal laws do not require actors within the 
financial industry to protect sensitive pension data. See 2016 REPORT, supra 
note 9, at 7 (finding that the GLBA does “not apply directly to . . . the sensitive 
individual data held in conjunction with [benefit] plans”). 
 109  See generally 15 U.S.C. § 6809(3) (defining “financial institution”). 
 110  45 C.F.R. §§ 160.102–160.103 (2018). 
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does not require covered entities to monitor third-party service pro-
viders,111 meaning it has less reach than ERISA does.112 
Finally, the FTC might try to assert its status as the “most prom-
inent” data security agency by using its expansive “unfair . . . acts 
or practices” authority to regulate the data security efforts of ERISA 
plans.113 This, however, would be an unsatisfactory outcome. First, 
the FTC’s approach is entirely reactive because it is based on post-
breach lawsuits, which in turn limits its value with respect to guiding 
regulated entities.114 Second, the FTC might not have jurisdiction to 
govern participants in employee benefit plans—its “unfair prac-
tices” authority only extends to actions that can harm “consum-
ers,”115 and its Enabling Act does not define which people are con-
sumers.116 Third, and most importantly, the FTC has no particular 
expertise in working with plan fiduciaries or analyzing ERISA doc-
uments. In sum, other federal agencies are ill-equipped to address 
the problem of data breaches involving employee benefit plans. The 
                                                                                                         
 111  See id. §§ 160.102–160.103, 164.504(e); Is a Covered Entity Liable for, or 
Required to Monitor, the Actions of Its Business Associates?, DEP’T HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS. (Dec. 19, 2002), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-profession-
als/faq/236/covered-entity-liable-for-action/index.html. 
 112  As an aside, application of HIPAA to a healthcare plan leads to somewhat 
of a preemption paradox. Because HIPAA is a federal law, fiduciaries of 
healthcare plans must comply with it. Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
of 1974 (ERISA) § 514(d), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) (2012). But while HIPAA itself 
preempts some state laws governing data security and privacy, it expressly ex-
cludes others from its preemption rules, including laws that are “more stringent” 
than the requirements under HIPAA. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d-2, 1320d-7 (2012); 
45 C.F.R. §§ 160.202, 160.203(b). At face value, HIPAA should not affect ERISA 
preemption of those state laws, because it only exempts them from HIPAA 
preemption and does not purport to say anything about ERISA preemption. The 
counterargument, however, is that by exempting certain “stringent” state laws 
from preemption, HIPAA essentially requires covered entities to comply with 
them, which in turn arguably makes compliance with those state laws a “law of 
the United States” not subject to ERISA preemption. See ERISA § 514(d). The 
answer here seems to be that ERISA preempts state laws even if HIPAA does not, 
given that HIPAA does not affirmatively impose those state laws. That said, the 
ultimate solution to this riddle is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 113  See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a), (n). 
 114  See infra Section IV.B (explaining the guidance failures that reactive reg-
ulatory approaches create in data law). 
 115  See 15 U.S.C. § 45(n). 
 116  See id. § 44. 
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DOL remains the go-to agency for matters affecting employee ben-
efit plans and must use its expertise to provide guidance for fiduci-
aries and protection for participants.117 
IV. A PROPOSED APPROACH TO THE DUTY OF PRUDENCE AND 
DATA SECURITY 
Although the DOL needs to assume a role in governing the data 
security practices of employee benefit plans, it first must have a co-
herent plan for how it intends to do so. Section IV.A summarizes the 
underlying policy goals the DOL should strive to achieve. Section 
IV.B explores why purely reactive regulatory approaches—
i.e., post-breach lawsuits—do not provide the type of meaningful 
guidance that is necessary in a rapidly changing and technologically 
involved field such as data security. Section IV.C outlines the sub-
stantive language the DOL can use in its regulation, and Sec-
tion IV.D explains how the proposed regulation, which appears as 
an Appendix to this Article, satisfies the DOL’s policy goals. 
A. Policy Goals of Data Security Regulation 
Stating that the goal of a data security law is to “protect data” 
seems needlessly vague and redundant, but laws in the field often 
take that exact approach.118 This Article proposes that any good data 
security law will consider three separate, concrete policy objectives. 
                                                                                                         
 117  See, e.g., Health Plans & Benefits, U.S. DEP’T LABOR, 
https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/health-plans (last visited Dec. 15, 2018) (de-
scribing the DOL’s oversight of health plans and benefits); Retirement Plans-Ben-
efits & Savings, U.S. DEP’T LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/general/topic/retirement 
(last visited Dec. 15, 2018) (describing the DOL’s oversight of employee bene-
fits); Fiduciary Education Campaign, U.S. DEP’T LABOR, 
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/employers-and-advisers/plan-administration-
and-compliance/fiduciary-responsibilities/fiduciary-education-campaign (last 
visited Dec. 15, 2018) (describing the DOL’s Fiduciary Education Campaign, 
which provides tools for ERISA fiduciaries to build “an understanding of the law 
and their responsibilities”); Field Assistance Bulletins, U.S. DEP’T LABOR, 
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/employers-and-advisers/guidance/field-assis-
tance-bulletins (last visited Dec. 15, 2018) (listing Field Assistance Bulletins, 
which offer guidance to providers). 
 118  See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 6801 (describing the purpose of the GLBA as “re-
spect[ing] the privacy of . . . customers and . . . protect[ing] the security and con-
fidentiality of . . . nonpublic personal information”). 
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First, it will try to minimize the number and severity of breaches by 
encouraging companies to adopt suitable defenses. Second, it will 
try to help victims of breaches recover. And third, it will try to min-
imize costs for regulated entities. Fortunately for the DOL, these 
three goals should look very familiar—they are analogous to 
ERISA’s goals of deterring fiduciary misconduct,119 protecting plan 
participants’ interests,120 and not imposing unnecessary administra-
tive costs on the sponsors of employee benefit plans.121 
The first goal—minimizing the number and severity of 
breaches—involves encouraging companies to adopt suitable de-
fenses against data breaches through a mix of deterrence and guid-
ance. Data security laws seek to establish at least some definite re-
quirements for regulated entities,122 impose costs on regulated enti-
ties that fail to meet those requirements, and educate regulated enti-
ties about their obligations.123 Importantly, data security experts 
across the board agree that individual companies must have the flex-
ibility to design their own practices for protecting sensitive data 
                                                                                                         
 119  Cf. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) §§ 409, 
501–02, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1109, 1131–32 (2012). 
 120  Cf. id. § 502(a)(1)(B) (permitting participants or beneficiaries to recover 
their promised benefits through private lawsuits). 
 121  See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 262–63 (1993). 
 122  Often, however, these “definite requirements” are only unclear standards, 
such as a requirement that companies “reasonably design[]” their defenses. See 
17 C.F.R. § 248.30(a) (2018). 
 123  Administrative agencies routinely provide guidance about data security—
particularly cybersecurity—to regulated entities. See, e.g., 2016 REPORT, supra 
note 9. The best example of administrative guidance is the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology’s voluntary framework for critical infrastructure. See 
NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING CRITICAL IN-
FRASTRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY (2017), https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/ 
documents/2017/12/05/draft-2_framework-v1-1_without-markup.pdf [hereinaf-
ter NIST FRAMEWORK]. 
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based upon their unique needs and capabilities.124 The alternative 
approach, in which a law imposes a laundry list of necessary data 
security policies and procedures, would undermine the goal of pro-
tecting sensitive data by diverting attention to “wooden compliance 
with a checklist of practices that may reduce future liability risk, but 
do not advance enterprise security.”125 Moreover, the practical is-
sues with trying to impose a top-down list of requirements are in-
surmountable. Even if a governmental entity could come up with a 
perfect list of data security practices that would apply equally well 
to all regulated entities (an impossible task), it would have trouble 
keeping that list current with rapid changes to technology and 
threats.126 
Unlike the first goal, which focuses on avoiding breaches or at 
least limiting their severity, the second goal emphasizes helping 
people in the breaches that will inevitably occur. In other words, it 
requires asking, “What can we give to the people who lost their sen-
sitive data in the breach and now are probably at an increased risk 
of identity theft?” To date, answering this question has befuddled 
the legal system. The most logical way to compensate victims of any 
type of harm is through private lawsuits and the common law of 
torts, but plaintiffs in data breach cases routinely fail to demonstrate 
                                                                                                         
 124  See, e.g., Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel J. Solove, The Scope and Potential 
of FTC Data Protection, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2230, 2259 (2015) [hereinafter 
Scope and Potential] (“[D]ata security changes too quickly and is far too depend-
ent upon context to be reduced to a one-size-fits-all checklist.”); Luis A. Aguilar, 
Comm’r Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, A Threefold Cord - Working Together to Meet 
the Pervasive Challenge of Cyber-Crime, Speech at the SINET Innovation Sum-
mit (June 25, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/threefold-cord-challenge-
of-cyber-crime.html (“[E]ntities must develop procedures that are tailored to their 
unique risks. This is essential, as it avoids a check-the-box approach to cyberse-
curity . . . .”). 
 125  Archis A. Parasharami & Stephen Lilley, Wyndham, Heartbleed, and the 
Pitfalls of Setting Cybersecurity Standards Through Litigation, COMPUTER L. 
REP., June & July 2014, at 22, 27 (2014) (emphasis added); see, e.g., Scope and 
Potential, supra note 124, at 2259; Aguilar, supra note 124.  
 126  See generally Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “DeOssifying” the 
Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1385–86 (1992) (describing the amount 
of time it takes a federal agency to pass a regulation under the Administrative 
Procedure Act). 
512 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:483 
concrete injuries for standing purposes, much less prove actual dam-
ages.127 Of course, money is not the only thing a law could provide 
to a data breach victim; breach notification laws seek to provide vic-
tims with information about data breaches, presumably reminding 
those victims to take steps to protect themselves (e.g., checking their 
credit scores).128 And even if a law does not require it, companies 
that experience breaches might have reputational reasons to offer 
free credit monitoring services to their customers.129 
Finally, the third goal of any good data security policy is cost 
control—regulations that impose too great of costs will inevitably 
stifle innovation and cause society greater harm than a data breach 
ever would.130 Similar to its ERISA counterpart, however, this goal 
                                                                                                         
 127  See supra Section I.B; Opderbeck, supra note 14, at 937–38 (describing 
the common types of plaintiffs in data breach lawsuits and the difficulties they 
have encountered). Even if a statute purported to give victims a defined cash 
amount in the aftermath of a breach (e.g., $50 per breach), those victims would 
still have to demonstrate standing in any private lawsuit to enforce the statute. See 
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1545, 1547–48, 1550 (2016) (holding 
that a plaintiff in a Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) lawsuit still had to prove 
the defendant’s violation actually caused him to suffer a concrete injury even 
though the FCRA provided a defined recovery amount of $100 to $1000 per will-
ful violation). 
 128  See Dennis Fisher, Data Breach Disclosure Laws Don’t Work, COMPUTER 
WKLY. (June 10, 2008, 5:00 AM), https://www.computerweekly.com/news/ 
2240022032/Data-breach-disclosure-laws-dont-work (“[N]otification laws do 
one thing very well: notify consumers of a data breach.”). 
 129  See PONEMON INST., THE AFTERMATH OF A DATA BREACH: CONSUMER 
SENTIMENT 1 (2014), https://www.ponemon.org/local/upload/file/Consumer%20 
Study%20on%20Aftermath%20of%20a%20Breach%20FINAL%202.pdf [here-
inafter DATA BREACH AFTERMATH]. 
 130  Cf. COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., CONFERENCE BD., REGULATION & THE ECON-
OMY: THE RELATIONSHIP & HOW TO IMPROVE IT 3–4 (2017), https://www.ced.org 
/pdf/CED_Report-Regulation_and_the_Economy2.pdf (quoting ORG. ECON. CO-
OPERATION DEV., REGULATORY POLICY AND GOVERNANCE: SUPPORTING ECO-
NOMIC GROWTH AND SERVING THE PUBLIC INTEREST (2011)) (“Regulations can 
also have unintended costs, when they become outdated or inconsistent with the 
achievement of policy objectives. The 2008 financial crisis—which resulted in 
part from poorly designed regulatory regimes and the uneven enforcement of ex-
isting regulations—and the ensuing and ongoing economic downturn starkly il-
lustrate the potential consequences of regulatory failure.”). 
For example, a theoretical way to prevent most data breach risks would be to 
outlaw companies from storing any sensitive data in electronic format. But people 
and companies probably would not be pleased with a law like this, given that it 
would eliminate many of our modern capabilities and comforts. 
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takes a secondary role to the other priorities. At face value, this pol-
icy objective normally seems to conflict with the first two goals; a 
dollar more of deterrence or victim compensation is a dollar less of 
savings. But a creative data security law will find a way to minimize 
this conflict, especially given that businesses themselves stand to 
lose sizeable amounts of money if they are victims of data 
breaches.131 
In practice, every law that seeks to regulate data security must 
strike a balance between these often-competing goals, seeking to 
maximize each while acknowledging that some sacrifices are neces-
sary. That said, regulatory entities should not focus solely on the 
theoretical justifications for their laws; they must consider whether 
their laws provide the desired results in practice.132 For example, 
consider breach notification laws. These laws generally seem to em-
phasize the first two goals (deterrence and compensation) while 
mostly ignoring the cost-control objective, except to the extent that 
they might impose lesser costs than some alternatives. Their success 
on the first two objectives, however, is suspect at best—experts dis-
agree about whether they impose great enough costs on businesses 
to deter poor security practices,133 and the value of the notifications 
to victims is equally unclear.134 Nevertheless, these three policy 
                                                                                                         
 131  DATA BREACH COSTS, supra note 20, at 1 (discussing the average costs of 
data breaches). In other words, if the costs of suffering a breach outweigh the costs 
of defending against the breach, then the company would actually save money by 
implementing the protections. 
 132  COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., supra note 130, at 3.  
 133  See Marcus Ranum & Bruce Schneier, State Breach Notification Laws: 
Have They Helped?, TECHTARGET (Jan. 10, 2009), https://searchsecurity.tech-
target.com/magazineContent/State-Data-Breach-Notification-Laws-Have-They-
Helped?vgnextfmt=print (debating the value of breach notification laws); cf. 
DATA BREACH AFTERMATH, supra note 129, at 1–10, 14–22 (studying the effects 
that breach notifications have on business-consumer relationships).  
 134  See Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and 
Breach Notification Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 5565, 5642 (Jan. 25, 2013) (finding that 
too many notifications might cause breach victims “unnecessary anxiety or even 
eventual apathy”); Sasha Romanosky et al., Do Data Breach Disclosure Laws 
Reduce Identity Theft?, 30 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 256, 280–81 (2011) (sug-
gesting that many victims who receive breach notifications do not take steps to 
protect themselves). 
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goals provide a framework for analyzing the intended and likely ef-
fects of any proposed data security law. 
B. Reactive vs. Proactive Regulatory Approaches 
Before advancing to this Article’s proactive regulation, it is worth 
revisiting the alternative: a reactive approach under which the DOL 
uses post-breach enforcement actions to provide guidance on a case-
by-case basis. In addition to the problem already addressed in Sec-
tion I.B—the difficulty in quantifying data breach harm—the reac-
tive regulatory approach would not adequately guide fiduciaries in 
their substantive responsibilities.135 At best, a post-breach enforce-
ment action can only hope to capture a historical understanding of a 
data security practice based on a certain set of facts, explaining why 
a specific defendant either lived up to or fell short of the enforcing 
agency’s standards. 
Proponents of administrative rulemaking-through-adjudication 
dispute this point, arguing that agency actions can build “the func-
tional equivalent of common law” for data security purposes.136 For 
example, Professors Solove and Hartzog created a list of twenty-five 
“inadequate security practices” as derived from the FTC’s civil ac-
tions against companies.137 But again, this list of practices was only 
current as of 2014 when they wrote their article, and we can only be 
certain of how these principles applied to specific companies that 
suffered specific data breaches.138 Moreover, some of these listed 
“principles” are so broad as to be effectively useless to companies 
trying to plan data security practices, such as the suggestion that 
those companies could face punishments for “failure[s] to monitor 
data recipients’ activit[ies].”139 
Ironically, the amorphous nature of a reactive regulatory ap-
proach is actually one of its features—proponents argue that it ena-
bles administrative agencies to avoid the normal difficulties associ-
ated with drafting comprehensive regulations that are sufficiently 
                                                                                                         
 135  See supra notes 126–30 and accompanying text (describing the importance 
of guidance as a goal). 
 136  Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common 
Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 619 (2014) [hereinafter Common Law 
of Privacy]. 
 137  Id. at 651–55. 
 138  See generally id. 
 139  Id. at 654. 
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broad without creating too many unintended secondary effects.140 
But this reactive approach would raise serious hindsight bias con-
cerns. A fiduciary might use every possible defense but still suffer a 
data breach; the risk is that a factfinder might give too much weight 
to the mere occurrence of the breach when considering whether the 
fiduciary did enough.141 Moreover, the idea that businesses must 
look to a collection of quasi-case law to determine their legal re-
sponsibilities is troubling, especially considering the legal expenses 
it would impose on small companies that might want to do nothing 
more than establish benefit plans for their employees.142 
Finally, the best-case scenario for this reactive approach, as far 
as guidance to regulated entities is concerned, is that experts in the 
field could synthesize the agency’s opinions into a list of compliance 
requirements.143 Again, however, these lists would only be historical 
records in a rapidly evolving field, and they would risk incentivizing 
regulated entities to engage in unwanted checkbox compliance that 
actually undermines data protection.144 In short, a purely reactive 
regulatory approach would be undesirable even if the DOL could 
issue fines—it would impose needless uncertainty and costs on fi-
duciaries trying to follow the DOL’s actions, and it would place an 
emphasis on judging yesterday’s problems rather than addressing 
tomorrow’s threats.145 
C. The Substance of the Duty to Protect Data 
The DOL’s task in creating a data security regulation might 
sound nearly impossible. Its final product needs to carefully balance 
                                                                                                         
 140  See Scope and Potential, supra note 124, at 2264–65. 
 141  Cf. Maggie Wittlin, Hindsight Evidence, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1359–
62 (2016) (describing the issues that hindsight bias can create for a factfinder in a 
lawsuit). Of course, the mere occurrence of a breach is not proof of imprudence. 
Even the National Security Agency has suffered multiple breaches. See Shane, 
supra note 28. 
 142  See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 262–63 (1993); Hurwitz, 
supra note 29, at 1012. 
 143  Cf. Common Law of Privacy, supra note 136, at 619, 651–55 (compiling a 
list of principles from FTC cases and touting them as being the “the functional 
equivalent of common law”). 
 144  See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
 145  See Parasharami & Lilley, supra note 125, at 23. 
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the goals of encouraging fiduciaries to craft their own suitable de-
fenses, protecting the interests of plan participants, and avoiding the 
creation of unnecessary cost barriers.146 Likewise, the final product 
must be clear enough that it will be useful in guiding fiduciaries’ 
behavior even considering the DOL’s statutory inability to impose 
monetary penalties.147 At the same time, however, the regulation 
cannot go too far in prescribing substantive defensive measures, 
such that fiduciaries fall into the trap of checkbox compliance by 
focusing more on meeting the DOL’s particular (and non-tailored) 
requirements than meeting their own unique needs.148 Finally, the 
DOL’s regulation must maintain its relevance even as technology 
and new threats continue to evolve at whirlwind paces.149 
Fortunately, the DOL can meet these objectives by taking a fresh 
approach to data security regulation that builds upon the duty of pru-
dence’s application in other contexts. To date, every governmental 
entity that has tried to regulate data security has focused on the sub-
stance of the policies and procedures that regulated entities develop, 
even if by stating only that the policies and procedures must be “rea-
sonabl[e].”150 Rather than adopting this old approach, the DOL 
should focus instead on the procedures by which fiduciaries develop 
their data security practices. In other words, the duty of prudence’s 
                                                                                                         
 146  See generally supra Section IV.A. 
 147  Although ERISA’s remedial scheme in its current form will inescapably 
hobble some of the DOL’s enforcement ability in the data security context, see 
supra Section II.B, a sufficiently clear regulation can hopefully overcome some 
of the deterrence losses through the forcefulness with which it defines fiduciaries’ 
obligations. 
 148  See, e.g., Parasharami & Lilley, supra note 125, at 23. 
 149  See generally CISCO, ANNUAL CYBERSECURITY REPORT 3–4 (2018), 
https://www.cisco.com/c/dam/en_us/about/doing_business/trust-center/docs/dp 
bs-2019.pdf (describing developing cybersecurity threats, including self-propa-
gating malware and the challenges of adapting cybersecurity to new areas such as 
new internet-connected devices and cloud platforms). 
 150  See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 248.30(a) (2018). Even breach notification laws take 
this approach, requiring regulated companies to adopt certain substantive policies 
and procedures (e.g., notify consumers in the aftermath of data breaches). See Se-
curity Breach Notification Laws, supra note 53. 
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application to data security must mirror its application to flounder-
ing pension investments—care in decision-making, rather than sub-
stantive outcomes, must determine prudence.151 
The best way to accomplish this outcome is by promulgating a 
regulation that conveys three messages to fiduciaries.152 The first of 
these messages must be that the fiduciaries themselves have broad 
discretion to design and adopt data security policies and procedures 
that meet their own needs and abilities.153 In this way, the DOL 
would actually give creative control to the fiduciaries, thus follow-
ing the expert consensus that optimal data security results from reg-
ulated entities being able to tailor-make their own policies and pro-
cedures to meet their unique situations.154 
The DOL’s regulation must clarify this overarching freedom 
with its second message to fiduciaries—they must act honestly when 
considering, adopting, and implementing their data security prac-
tices.155 After all, the only way a self-created policy or procedure 
will have value in protecting sensitive data is if the fiduciary genu-
inely seeks to achieve the goal of data protection when designing it 
and acts prudently in doing so. At first glance, this focus on what we 
might call good-faith efforts seems to replace one uncertain standard 
(“were the fiduciary’s ultimate data security practices substantively 
prudent?”) with another (“did the fiduciary adopt its ultimate data 
                                                                                                         
 151  Cf. Bd. of Tr. of City of Birmingham Emp.’s Ret. Sys. v. Comerica Bank, 
767 F. Supp. 2d 793, 802 (E.D. Mich. 2011) (“The ultimate outcome of an invest-
ment is not proof of imprudence.”). 
 152  The Appendix provides draft language of a regulation the DOL could 
promulgate at 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-6 (currently unused). To explore how the 
specific regulatory language incorporates the concepts described above, this Sec-
tion will cite directly to the Appendix, using provisions of the proposed regulation 
as though it were an existing regulation. 
 153  See infra Appendix, at (b)(1)(ii), (c)(1)(i). 
 154  See generally NIST FRAMEWORK, supra note 123, at 2 (“[This] Framework 
is not a one-size-fits-all approach to managing cybersecurity risk for critical in-
frastructure. Organizations will continue to have unique risks—different threats, 
different vulnerabilities, different risk tolerances—and how they implement the 
practices in the Framework will vary. Organizations can determine activities that 
are important to critical service delivery and can priorities investments to maxim-
ize the impact of each dollar spent.”). 
 155  See infra Appendix, at (a)(4), (b)(1)(i)–(ii), (c)(1)(i), (f)(2). 
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security practices in a prudent manner?”).156 But the DOL can over-
come this potential issue with the regulation’s third crucial message: 
fiduciaries have the burden of affirmatively proving they acted pru-
dently in considering data security policies and procedures, and they 
must keep detailed records as evidence of that prudence.157 
To be effective, these records must contain enough information 
so that the DOL can assess whether a fiduciary approached its data 
security obligations with the actual focus of protecting participant 
data.158 Fortunately, by placing the burden on fiduciaries to prove 
they acted prudently, the regulation actually incentivizes them to 
create and maintain these records; every record a fiduciary can pro-
duce of a policy or procedure it considered is another piece of evi-
dence it can use to bolster its case.159 Notably, the regulation should 
distinguish between records the fiduciary keeps with respect to its 
own policies and procedures and those it makes when selecting and 
monitoring third-party service providers.160 This distinction flows 
from the fact that a fiduciary will have different considerations when 
protecting data in its possession than when it ensures outsiders are 
also protecting the data.161 
One added bonus of the regulation’s emphasis on procedures 
and recordkeeping requirements is that it gives some teeth to the 
DOL’s role as an enforcer.162 Although it might not be obvious at 
first, one of the implications of requiring fiduciaries to consider pol-
icies and procedures that might protect their data is that the DOL 
itself has the power to suggest substantive practices they might 
adopt. The DOL might do this broadly, such as by issuing a guidance 
letter with respect to a new technology, or it might do it individually 
after auditing a particular plan’s data security policies. This DOL 
power to offer suggestions does not change the fact that the fiduciary 
has the ultimate discretion to decide whether to adopt or reject the 
                                                                                                         
 156  See infra Appendix, at (a)(1)–(5). 
 157  See infra Appendix, at (b)(3)–(4), (c)(2)–(3), (e). 
 158  See infra Appendix, at (a)(1)–(5). 
 159  See infra Appendix, at (b)(3). 
 160  Compare infra Appendix, at (b) (the fiduciary’s policies and procedures 
for protecting data that it keeps), with Appendix, at (c) (third-party service pro-
vider selection). 
 161  See supra note 160. 
 162  See supra Section II.B. 
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proposal.163 But if the fiduciary does not at least consider the pro-
posal and create a record of its decision-making process, it will ef-
fectively prove it was not acting with the goal of protecting its 
data.164 
Beyond those three primary messages, the regulation must cover 
a few other technical matters. First, in addition to providing fiduci-
aries the freedom to adopt their own policies and procedures, the 
regulation must expressly recognize their ability to reject considered 
policies in good faith, even if DOL regulators might have recom-
mended its adoption.165 Otherwise, the fiduciaries will not actually 
have the ability to design their own policies and procedures in any 
meaningful sense. Second, the regulation should prescribe at least a 
few substantive policies and procedures that fiduciaries must 
adopt—they must have plans for keeping all their policies and pro-
cedures current, vetting potential service providers, and monitoring 
existing service providers.166 Third, the regulation should encourage 
cost control by permitting multiple fiduciaries for a plan to keep only 
a single set of records, rather than trying to maintain them on a per-
                                                                                                         
 163  See infra Appendix, at (f)(2). 
 164  See infra Appendix, at (e)(1)(ii) (requiring fiduciaries to prove they sought 
to protect data). Paragraph (e)(2) of the regulation provides factors for making 
this analysis. These factors seek merely to provide helpful guidance, rather than a 
conclusive element test, for analyzing a fiduciary’s good-faith compliance. 
 165  See infra Appendix, at (f)(2). 
 166  See infra Appendix, at (b)(2). Notably, the DOL must still give fiduciaries 
the flexibility to shape their particular plans described in this paragraph. But the 
point is that every plan should have some version of these three substantive poli-
cies, given their universal applicability. For example, all plans must keep their 
policies and procedures current, and it is consistent with the rest of the regulation 
to provide the fiduciaries themselves the freedom to decide how they will keep 
the policies and procedures current. 
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fiduciary basis.167 Fourth, the regulation should generally have pre-
cise wording, considering that its value as a source of guidance to 
fiduciaries will naturally flow from its clarity.168 
D. Policy Benefits of the Proposed Regulation 
Simply put, this proposed focus on procedure over substance fits 
well with the policy goals of data security regulation.169 It certainly 
advances the objective of minimizing the number and severity of 
data breaches by providing fiduciaries with clear obligations while 
still respecting their unique needs and capabilities.170 At the same 
time, it avoids the risks of checkbox compliance by refusing to pre-
scribe substantive requirements other than recordkeeping obliga-
tions and a few minor limitations on fiduciary discretion as de-
scribed above.171 Finally, it is designed to withstand the tests of time 
and the evolution of technology. The best substantive practices for 
                                                                                                         
 167   See infra Appendix, at (d). 
 168  A fifth consideration that might appear in the regulation would be to clarify 
whether plan participants and beneficiaries may request these records. Plan par-
ticipants and beneficiaries can demand copies of “instruments under which the 
plan is . . . operated,” which might arguably include any policies or procedures for 
securing plan data. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) 
§ 104(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(4) (2012). Alternatively, we might view those 
records as being standard human resources policies for safeguarding employee 
information, rather than substantive documents governing the administration of 
benefits in line with the plan’s overarching purpose. But the release of any records 
showing the plan’s data security practices might compromise those practices, 
which benefits neither the plan itself nor the participants that ERISA is designed 
to protect. Of course, this potential issue likely already exists in the absence of 
any regulation for sophisticated fiduciaries who already maintain policies and pro-
cedures for safeguarding plan data. Nevertheless, the DOL’s regulation might ex-
pressly exempt data security policies from disclosure under a section 104(b)(4) 
request, or it might permit fiduciaries to redact the documents, only provide a 
summary of the documents, or only produce a list of the documents. See generally 
Id. § 505 (granting the DOL broad authority to issue regulations under ERISA). 
 169  See supra Section IV.A. It also recognizes that nobody has all the answers 
with respect to protecting data. Id. 
 170  See supra Section IV.A. 
 171  See supra Section IV.C. 
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protecting data constantly change; the procedures by which thought-
ful companies consider and adopt those practices, however, remain 
constant.172 
Moreover, it advances the cost-control outcome in a couple of 
ways. First, the freedom it provides fiduciaries permits them to op-
erate within their own means. Second, and somewhat indirectly, it 
promotes good data security practices, which in turn reduces com-
plying fiduciaries’ risks of suffering data breaches and incurring the 
related economic costs.173 As a result, it would avoid being need-
lessly burdensome on fiduciaries and employers that sponsor em-
ployee benefit plans.  
Most importantly, the proposed regulation provides needed clar-
ity in a developing and constantly shifting area of the law.174 It in-
structs fiduciaries and the attorneys who advise them while simulta-
neously assuring participants of what they can expect from the peo-
ple and businesses entrusted with their data. Otherwise, an indeter-
minate term like “prudence” might take on any number of meanings 
in the data security context—it could imply a focus on the substan-
tive policies fiduciaries adopt, the procedures by which they adopt 
them, or some mix of the two.  
Under the Supreme Court’s Hardt v. Reliance Standard Insur-
ance Company decision, a plaintiff can win an award of attorney 
                                                                                                         
 172  The proposed regulation does not expressly purport to advance the second 
goal of data law—compensating breach victims—in any concrete way. Given the 
historical challenges that this policy outcome has posed for the legal system, it 
seems most appropriate to afford fiduciaries the same flexibility in determining 
the best ways to care for their participants who lose data in a breach. And it is not 
outside the realm of possibility to assume they might actually do a fine job of this. 
Companies have economic incentives to “compensate” their consumers who suf-
fer data losses—e.g., by offering free credit monitoring services. See, e.g., Chris-
tine DiGangi, Anthem Breach Victims Can Get Free Credit Monitoring This 
Week, YAHOO FIN. (Feb. 12, 2015), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/anthem-
breach-victims-free-cedit-180017134.html. 
 173  See DATA BREACH COSTS, supra note 20, at 26–28 (analyzing the costs 
that businesses experience in the aftermath of data breaches). 
 174  See Hooker & Pill, supra note 48, at 31 (describing the current state of 
cybersecurity law as a “legal fracas” requiring attorneys to utilize “a patchwork 
of common law and state or federal statutory claims to obtain relief”). 
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fees merely by showing “some degree of success on the merits” re-
gardless of whether he or she ultimately wins damages.175 As a re-
sult, fiduciaries are almost certain to face lawsuits even without 
DOL action in the area of data security.176 But DOL guidance would 
help plaintiffs focus their efforts on fiduciaries that actually do en-
gage in misconduct by not considering data security practices or 
keeping appropriate records, and it would help responsible fiduciar-
ies ward off frivolous lawsuits quickly and efficiently. Everybody 
would benefit from increased clarity regarding data security prac-
tices, and the DOL has all the tools it needs to provide that necessary 
guidance.177 
CONCLUSION 
Although the DOL has not yet provided ERISA fiduciaries con-
crete guidance on the duty of prudence’s application to data security, 
it is in a perfect position to do so. Armed with the benefit of aca-
demic works and other agencies’ experiences, it can craft the duty 
of prudence in a manner that encourages the protection of sensitive 
data while remaining consistent with other applications of the duty. 
                                                                                                         
 175  560 U.S. 242, 255 (2010) (citing Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 
694 (1983)). 
 176  Any lawsuits would need to be under ERISA section 502(a)(3) or 
502(a)(5), which permit the DOL, plan participants, beneficiaries, or fiduciaries 
to petition for “appropriate equitable relief” to address ERISA violations, includ-
ing duty-of-prudence breaches. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974 (ERISA) § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2012). Although ERISA sec-
tion 502(a)(2) permits damages lawsuits (as opposed to equitable ones) against 
ERISA fiduciaries who breach their duties, the recoverable damages in those 
cases must go to the plan itself; individual participants and beneficiaries cannot 
recover compensatory or punitive damages. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 
473 U.S. 134, 144–48 (1985). As a result, participants cannot attempt to use 
ERISA section 502(a)(2) to attempt to claim damages resulting from any breach, 
such as the costs of purchasing identity protection plans. But even though an 
award of “appropriate equitable relief” under ERISA section 502(a)(3)—such as 
an order to cease acting imprudently with respect to data security—would not 
entitle participants to money damages, victorious plaintiffs could (and likely 
would) still recover attorney fees. ERISA § 502(g)(1). Therefore, the incentive to 
bring post-breach lawsuits against fiduciaries remains. 
 177  Even in the absence of an affirmative regulation from the DOL, the stand-
ards described in the draft regulation, located in the Appendix of this Article, 
likely are best practices. The point is that the DOL’s formal adoption of a regula-
tion would carry with it a sense of authority. 
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The DOL’s goal is straightforward: encourage the creation of flexi-
ble, inventive, and tailored plans for addressing the modern threat of 
data theft. By emphasizing the procedures by which fiduciaries de-
velop their data security practices, rather than the substantive prac-
tices themselves, the DOL can promote a new system that encour-
ages responsibility, flexibility, and—above all else—security. 
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APPENDIX 
PROPOSED LANGUAGE OF THE NEW REGULATION 
29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-6: Fiduciary 
Requirements for the Protection of 
Sensitive Data.[178] 
(a) In General. 
(1) The duty of prudence found in section 404(a)(1)(B) of 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B), requires fiduciaries of em-
ployee benefit plans to protect the sensitive data they en-
counter during the course of their duties. 
(2) Complying with the duty of prudence with respect to 
protecting sensitive data involves both securing any sen-
sitive data the fiduciary keeps in its possession, as well 
as vetting and monitoring service providers who have ac-
cess to any sensitive data. 
(3) A fiduciary must comply with this section to meet the 
requirement to protect sensitive data under the duty of 
prudence. 
(4) The purpose of this section is to encourage fiduciaries to 
consider and develop their own data security policies and 
procedures with the honest goal of protecting sensitive 
data, given that fiduciaries are in the best position to an-
alyze the plan’s individual needs and capabilities in this 
regard. 
(5) This section shall only apply to persons acting in their 
capacities as fiduciaries. 
                                                                                                         
 178  Cf. Gregg Moran, The SEC’s Data Dilemma, 96 NEB. L. REV. 446, 482–83 
(2017) (applying similar concepts to the Security and Exchange Commission’s 
Safeguards Rule of 17 C.F.R. § 248.30). 
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(b) Duty with Respect to Data in the Fiduciary’s Possession or 
Control. 
(1) Requirements. 
(i) The fiduciary must consider and adopt written pol-
icies and procedures that address administrative, 
technical, and physical safeguards for the protec-
tion of sensitive data within its possession or con-
trol. 
(ii) Although this section does not prescribe a specific 
number of policies and procedures a fiduciary must 
consider or adopt, the fiduciary must consider 
enough policies and procedures to show that he, 
she, or it genuinely is trying to protect the sensitive 
data in accordance with paragraph (a)(4). 
(iii) The fiduciary must create and maintain the records 
described in paragraph (b)(3). 
(2) Necessary Policies and Procedures. The policies and 
procedures described in subparagraph (b)(1)(i) must in-
clude: 
(i) A plan for keeping all adopted policies and proce-
dures (including the one described in this subpara-
graph) current; 
(ii) A plan for vetting the data security practices of po-
tential service providers; and 
(iii) A plan for monitoring the data security practices of 
current service providers, including the frequency 
with which the fiduciary will monitor the service 
providers. 
(3) Recordkeeping. The records described in paragraph 
(b)(2) must include: 
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(i) In the case of any considered policy or procedure, 
whether ultimately adopted or rejected, a detailed 
description of the process by which the decision to 
adopt or reject was made. This record must include, 
at a minimum: 
(A) A description of any investigations into the 
costs and benefits of the considered policy or 
procedure; 
(B) A description of any person involved in any 
way in the decision to accept or reject the 
considered policy or procedure (including 
persons whose involvement was limited to 
gathering or presenting information to the ul-
timate decisionmakers); and 
(C) The time and money spent on considering the 
policy or procedure. 
(ii) In the case of an adopted policy or procedure (in-
cluding any amendments to or revocations of any 
existing policies or procedures): 
(A) A brief description of the policy or proce-
dure, both as proposed and as adopted; 
(B) A detailed description of the reasons for ac-
cepting adoption of the final policy or proce-
dure, including explanations of any changes 
to the policy or procedure from its originally 
proposed form; and 
(C) A description of the plan for implementing 
the policy or procedure. 
(iii) In the case of a rejected policy or procedure, a brief 
description of the considered policy or procedure 
and a detailed description of the reasons for reject-
ing its adoption. 
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(4) Records Maintenance. 
(i) The fiduciary must keep the records required by 
paragraph (b)(2) for a period no shorter than five 
years. 
(ii) In the case of any record relating to a currently 
adopted policy or procedure (including records of 
proposed amendments to or revocations of the pol-
icy or procedure), the fiduciary must keep the rec-
ord for as long as the policy or procedure is in ef-
fect. 
(c) Duty with Respect to Selecting and Monitoring Service 
Providers. 
(1) Requirements. 
(i) The fiduciary must not use any service provider un-
less it genuinely believes the service provider will 
adequately protect any sensitive data to which it 
has access. To accomplish this purpose, the fiduci-
ary must comply with the vetting and monitoring 
requirements of subparagraphs (c)(1)(ii) and 
(c)(1)(iii). 
(ii) Before hiring a potential service provider that will 
have any access to the sensitive data, the fiduciary 
must inquire into its data security practices, creat-
ing a record of the inquiry as described in para-
graph (c)(2). 
(iii) The fiduciary must regularly monitor the data se-
curity practices of any service providers that has 
access to any of the sensitive data. Whenever the 
fiduciary checks the data security practices of one 
of the plan’s service providers, it must create a rec-
ord of its observations as described in paragraph 
(c)(2). 
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(2) Recordkeeping. The records described in subpara-
graphs (c)(1)(ii) and (c)(1)(iii) must include: 
(i) General information about the service provider, 
such as its name and contact information; 
(ii) The names of any specific contacts for the service 
provider who provided the fiduciary with infor-
mation about the service provider’s data security 
practices; 
(iii) A generalized description of the particular sensi-
tive data the service provider needs to perform its 
duties and the reasons it needs the sensitive data; 
(iv) Any information the fiduciary has learned about 
the service provider’s data security practices, in-
cluding the fiduciary’s impressions of the service 
provider’s data security practices; 
(v) Copies of any documentation the fiduciary re-
ceived from the service provider regarding the ser-
vice provider’s data security practices; 
(vi) A brief description of the known data security prac-
tices of any of the service provider’s competitors 
that the fiduciary has also contacted or examined; 
(vii) A brief description of any factors other than data 
security that weigh for or against using the service 
provider; and 
(viii) Any other information the fiduciary believes would 
be appropriate. 
(3) Records Maintenance. The fiduciary must keep the rec-
ords described in paragraph (c)(2) for a period no shorter 
than five years. 
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(d) Combining Records. If an employee benefit plan has more 
than one fiduciary, the fiduciaries of the plan may elect to keep 
a single set of records (as required by paragraphs (b)(2) and 
(c)(2) of this section) for the plan rather than keeping separate 
records as individual fiduciaries. 
(e) Burden of Proof. The fiduciary shall bear the burden of prov-
ing he, she, or it complied with the requirements of this sec-
tion. 
(1) To meet his, her, or its burden under this subsection, the 
fiduciary must make two showings: 
(i) The fiduciary complied with the objective, tech-
nical requirements of this section, such as its 
recordkeeping obligations; and 
(ii) The fiduciary complied with the purpose of this 
section, as defined in paragraph (a)(4), by having 
the honest goal of protecting sensitive data through 
the development of tailored policies and proce-
dures. 
(2) The following factors, none of which is singularly deter-
minative, shall help guide any inquiry under subpara-
graph (e)(1)(ii): 
(i) The fiduciary’s compliance with the objective, 
technical requirements of this section; 
(ii) The amount and nature of sensitive data maintained 
by the employee benefit plan; 
(iii) The employee benefit plan’s needs with respect to 
its sensitive data; 
(iv) The sophistication of the particular fiduciary; 
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(v) The resources available to the particular fiduciary; 
and 
(vi) Any other evidence, considering the particular cir-
cumstances of each fiduciary, tending to show 
whether the fiduciary seriously considered its data 
security obligations under this section. 
(f) Definitions. For purposes of this section, the following defini-
tions apply: 
(1) Adopt. The term “adopt” means to put a policy or pro-
cedure for protecting sensitive data into writing, imple-
ment it, and keep it current. 
(2) Consider. The term “consider” means to examine a pro-
posed policy or procedure and, after genuinely assessing 
its advantages and disadvantages, adopt or reject it. 
(3) Sensitive Data. The phrase “sensitive data” means any 
information about the participants of an employee bene-
fits plan. Examples include the participants’ contact in-
formation, account information, medical information, or 
employment information. 
(4) Service Provider. The phrase “service provider” means 
any entity or natural person that provides services of any 
kind to an employee benefit plan, except that it shall not 
include the employees or fiduciaries of the plan itself. 
